The External Dimension of International Family Law by Pataut, Etienne
HAL Id: halshs-02268861
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02268861
Submitted on 21 Aug 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
The External Dimension of International Family Law
Etienne Pataut
To cite this version:
Etienne Pataut. The External Dimension of International Family Law. Marise Cremona; Hans-W
Micklitz. Private Law in the External Relations of the EU, Oxford University Press, pp.107-124,
2016, 9780198744566. ￿10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198744566.003.0006￿. ￿halshs-02268861￿
	 1	
The External Dimension of International Family Law 
 
 
 
Etienne Pataut 
Sorbonne School of law (University of Paris 1) 
 
Working paper 
 
Family law is not — to say the least — at the heart of the European Union (EU). The EU does 
not have any competence in family law, which remains in the hands of the Member States. 
Therefore, if EU law modifies family law, and it does so, it is only indirectly. 
Immigration law, firstly, has an impact on family law. The EU is now an area providing 
freedom of movement to all its citizens. Citizens have an unconditional right to move from 
one country to another, including with their families. Based on this principle, secondary law 
and case law have built a great number of solutions in order to promote the freedom of 
movement, such as the recognition of ‘family status’ and access to social benefits. Those rules 
frequently concern nationals of third countries who have a family link with a European citizen 
or a long-term residence in the EU. Therefore, freedom of movement of EU citizens has an 
important impact both on family law and on immigration rules toward third countries 
nationals. 
The second margin is private international law. According to article 81 TFUE, the EU has the 
competence to adopt rules on private international law. On the basis of this competence, the 
EU has adopted, over the last 15 years, many Regulations in the area of private international 
law in general, and, more particularly in family matters. In doing so, the fundamental goal of 
the EU was to build a legal regime, which allows for a close cooperation between Member 
States, closer than between Member States and third States.  
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Third States, however, cannot be entirely disregarded.1 Families can, and often do have 
connections with third countries, either by nationality or domicile and are thererfore subject to 
EU law. The EU’s attempts to tackle those issues are twofold, and raise separate questions 
that are addressed in this paper. First, the EU took competence to enter into international 
conventions with third countries, the so-called ‘external competence’. As discussed in the first 
part of this paper, the exercise of this competence, raises difficulties in family law. Second, 
EU instruments on private international family law, although primarily designed for EU 
judges and EU citizens, have an impact on third countries nationals. As detailed in the second 
part of this paper, the exact scope of this impact remains uncertain.  
 
I. The EU’s External Competence in the Field of Family Law 
 
Treaty making power 
The first question is nothing more than the private international aspect of the traditional treaty 
making power question: who has the power to negotiate, sign and finally ratify an 
international convention? Of course, this question is not specific to family law. However, 
experience shows that as far as private international law is concerned, most of the issues were 
raised in a family law context. 
As a general rule, set up in the famous ERTA case2, the EU’s external competence depends on 
the exercise of its internal competence. This rule has been applied to private international law 
by the Court of justice in its equally famous 1/94 opinion about the Lugano Convention.3 In 
this opinion, the Court stated that the external competence in private international law should 
be given to the EU and not to the Member States because the EU exercised its internal 
competence in the field by adopting, among others, the Brussels 1 Regulation. 
																																																								
1 See already: A. Malatesta, S. Bariatti, F. Pocar (eds.), The external dimension of EC private international law 
in Family and Successions Matters, Studi e pubblicazioni delle rivista di diritto internazionale privato et 
processuale, vol. 71, CEDAM, 2008. See also, in the present volume: Stephanie Francq, “The External 
Dimension of the Rome I and Rome II Regulations: A Policy of Neutrality, Contrasting the Balanced 
Unilateralism of EU Substantive Law”, supra, chap. 4 and Angela Ward & N Jääskinen, “The External Reach of 
EU Private Law in the Light of L’Oreal v eBay and Google and Google Spain”, infra, chap. 6. 
2 ECJ, 31 March 1971, 22/70, Commission v. Council. 
3 Opinion 1/03, Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. For a thorough analysis, see F. Pocar 
(ed.), The external competence of the EU and Private International Law, Studi e pubblicazioni delle rivista di 
diritto internazionale privato et processuale, vol. 67, CEDAM, 2007. 
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This issue has raised some new difficulties concerning the legal relations between Member 
States, the EU, and third States.  
A good illustration of those difficulties can be seen in the EU’s participation in the Hague 
Conference on private international law.4 Those who follow the work of the Conference might 
remember the effect the entry into force of the Amsterdam treaty had on the negotiations of 
the worldwide convention on jurisdiction, then discussed in The Hague. 5  Indeed, the 
Commission took over those negotiations in spite of objections — and even some bitterness 
— expressed by Member States delegations.  The Commission did so because, it considered 
that under Article 65 EC (now 81 TFEU), the EU had sole competence in private international 
law matters. 
This shift of power resulted in a modification of the very statute of the Conference, adopted in 
2005 and entered into force in 2007: article 3 of the statute now allows that a ‘Regional 
Economic Integration Organisation’ may become a member of the Conference. Although 
drafted in general terms, this provision was clearly designed to allow for the EU’s accession 
to the Conference.6 Indeed, the EU became a member of the Conference on 3 April 2007.7 
Since, the EU has ratified the 2007 texts on Maintenance and signed the 2005 Convention on 
choice of forum.8  Therefore, it is now clear that Member States have competence to 
sign/ratify conventions adopted before 2007, whereas the EU has competence for those 
adopted thereafter. 
However, this solution is not as simple as it seems, and raises some further problems which 
are diplomatic and/or political, as much as legal, particularly in family matters.  																																																								
4 W. Warlet, ‘La participation de l’Union européenne à la conférence de La Haye’, in : M. Benlolo-Carabot, U. 
Candas et E. Cujo (eds.), Union Européenne et droit international, mélanges en l’honneur de P. Daillier, 
CEDIN – Pedone, 2012, p. 785. 
5 These negotiation eventually failed due to lacking consensus among the negotiating States ; the work of the 
Conference, nevertheless, led to the adoption of the 2005 choice of forum Convention.   
6 Statute, art. 3 (available on www.hcch.net) 
‘(1) The Member States of the Conference may, at a meeting concerning general affairs and policy where the 
majority of Member States is present, by a majority of the votes cast, decide to admit also as a Member any 
Regional Economic Integration Organisation which has submitted an application for membership to the 
Secretary General. References to Members under this Statute shall include such Member Organisations, except 
as otherwise expressly provided. The admission shall become effective upon the acceptance of the Statute by the 
Regional Economic Integration Organisation concerned. 
(2) To be eligible to apply for membership of the Conference, a Regional Economic Integration Organisation 
must be one constituted solely by sovereign States, and to which its Member States have transferred competence 
over a range of matters within the purview of the Conference, including the authority to make decisions binding 
on its Member States in respect of those matters.’ 
7 Council Decision 2006/719/EC of 5 October 2006 on the accession of the Community to the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law, OJ L 297, 26.10.2006, p. 1–14. 
8  For details, see Hague Conference on Private International Law, Choice of Forum Convention, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.details&sid=220 . 
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The following sections will discuss three of them briefly.   
Forcing ratification: The 1996 Child Convention of 1996 
Between 1999 (entry into force of the Amsterdam treaty) and 2007 (modification of the 
Hague Conference status and accession of the EU to the Conference), the situation regarding 
Hague Conventions was ambiguous.  On the one hand, the ratification of pre-2007 
conventions was in the hands of the individual Member States, as discussed above. On the 
other hand, ratification of those conventions also required at least pan-European co-
ordination, since EU had gain competence over private international law issues.  
A good example of how this ambiguous situation affected the ratification process of The 
Hague conventions can be seen in what happened regarding the 1996 Child Protection 
Convention. This convention had been negotiated and signed at a time when the EU had no 
competence on private international law yet. At the same time, the political decision was 
taken in EU to address questions of international jurisdiction in family matters in a 
convention, the Brussels 2 1998 Convention9, which was transformed into a Regulation 
before even entering into force.10 As both texts (the 1996 Hague Convention and the then 
Brussels 2 Convention) concerned international child protection, the simultaneousness of the 
negotiations of those conventions led to some diplomatic turmoil in The Hague. The members 
of the Hague Conference felt that EU Member States did not negotiate in good faith because 
the EU negotiations were secret, whereas the Hague discussions were transparent and public. 
Indeed, the critics from the Hague were largely justified : as the EU did not have any internal 
competence at the time, as far as international convention are concerned, the 100 years old 
Hague experience gave the organisation a strong legitimacy to lead and international 
discussion on the topic. 
Anyway, both texts were eventually adopted and the question of ratification arose. According 
to the Statute of the Hague Conference and EU law at the time it was clear that the 
competence to ratify the Child Protection Convention laid in the hands of the Member States. 
However, this competence started to shift shortly thereafter: in 1999, competence in private 
international law issues was transferred to the EU, and in 2000, the EU exercised this 
																																																								
9 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and 
Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice, OJ C 221 of 16.07.1998. 
10 Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of 
judgements in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for joint children, OJ L 160 of 
30.06.2000 (Brussels 2 Reg.), now replaced by the so-called Brussels 2 bis Reg., n° 2201/2003, OJ L 338 of 
23.12. 2003. 
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competence by adopting the Regulation Brussels 2. Even though the European Court of 
Justice had not yet rendered its Lugano opinion, discussed above, it could already be argued 
at that time that, since internal competence had been exercised, external competence should 
follow. 
Such was indeed the view of the European Council. It adopted a specific decision, the title of 
which is telling: ‘Council Decision of 19 December 2002 authorising the Member States, in 
the interest of the Community, to sign the 1996 Hague Convention’. 11  
Recital 4 of this decision states as follows:  
‘The Community has exclusive competence for the relevant provisions of the Convention 
insofar as those articles affect Community rules adopted in this area. The Member States 
should retain their competence in the areas covered by the Convention which do not affect 
Community law.’ 
However, the legal situation was less clear than this strong wording might suggest. Indeed, 
only the Member States could become a party to the 1996 Convention (as stated in recital 5 of 
the above-mentioned decision by the EU Council).  Accordingly, the decision concerning 
ratification ultimately also lay in the hands of the Member States.. While the political need for 
a unified European action had thus become obvious, the legal basis for such an common 
action was far less clear.  
It took some political pressure towards the Member States to obtain ratification from all from 
them. In particular, political difficulties concerning the status of Gibraltar polluted the whole 
discussion. Because of the territorial dispute between UK and Spain relating to the status of 
Gibraltar, both countries were unable to agree upon the applicability of the 1996 children 
Convention to Gibraltar. The situation, appeared completely blocked, and led to an unusually 
firm letter from the Secretary General of the Hague Conference to the President of the 
Council of the European Union of 25 October 2005.12 In the letter, the Secretary General 
urged all the Member States to find an agreement so as not to jeopardize the entry into force 
of the 1996 Convention. Eventually, both the UK and Spain ratified the 1996 Convention, 
albeit with some reservations. Other Member States also took time to ratify the 1996 																																																								
11 Council Decision 2003/93/EC of 19 December 2002 authorising the Member States, in the interest of the 
Community, to sign the 1996 Hague Convention on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and 
cooperation in respect of parental responsibility and measures for the protection of children, OJ L 48, 
21.02.2003. 
12 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Letter from the Secretary General of the Hague Conference 
to the President of the Council of the European Union: http://www.hcch.net/upload/tb_e.pdf 
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Convention.  It entered into force as late as September 2014 in Belgium. Italy has still not 
ratified.13   
The course of event shows that the ratification issue was not as obvious as stated by the 
European Council in its above-cited 2002 decision. Theoretically, the EU could take legal 
action against the last reluctant Member State (Italy), but in practice has not done so. This 
shows that there is still some remaining uncertainty about the exact scope of the external 
competence of the EU in this field. Politics, here, is difficult to distinguish from law.  
 
Expanding the external competence: The 2007 Maintenance Convention 
 
Maintenance is an area of law where lack of international texts is not to be feared. The Hague 
Conference adopted three sets of conventions, all of which are still in force today: (i) two 
conventions on maintenance obligations toward children (1956 and 1958); (ii) two 
conventions on maintenance in general, applicable law and recognition and enforcement 
(1973); and (iii) two conventions on recovery and applicable law, the second one being called 
the Hague Protocol (2007).14 Meanwhile, the EU decided to take its own legal path and 
adopted a specific text, the Maintenance 4/2009 Regulation.15 
Such an abundance of texts necessarily creates the risk of overlaps and other difficulties 
relating to the coordination of those instruments.16 Those problems are addressed in the 
instruments themselves, which contain various provisions on the relations between those legal 
instruments. The discussion here will focus more specifically on the relationship between the 
EU Regulation 4/2009 and the 2007 Hague Protocol on the law applicable to maintenance. 
																																																								
13  Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=70 
14 This last text is called Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the law applicable to Maintenance obligations. Use 
of the term ‘protocol’ rather than the usual ‘convention’ is due to political and practical reasons, and has no 
impact on its legal nature. 
15 Council Regulation No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, OJ L 7, 10.01.2009, p. 
1. 
16 For a general survey, see P. Beaumont, B. Hess, L. Walker and S. Spancken (eds), The Recovery of 
Maintenance in the EU and Worldwide, Studies in Private International Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014. 
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The first project for a the Regulation by the Commission, in 2005, contained several detailed 
provisions on the law applicable to maintenance obligation.17 However, in 2007, when the 
Hague Protocol on applicable law was adopted, the Commission decided to modify the 
structure of the draft Regulation: while the draft Regulation still contained rules on 
jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement provisions on the applicable law were deleted.  
Instead, the Regulation refers to the Hague Protocol in its very original Article 15, which 
states:  
‘The law applicable to maintenance obligations shall be determined in accordance with the 
Hague Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the law applicable to maintenance obligations in the 
Member States bound by that instrument.’ 
This solution is striking, since it incorporates into European legislation a text that has been 
adopted at international level, outside the EU’s legislative procedures.18 This novel solution 
is, however, not without difficulties. The most important one, in practice, concerns the entry 
into force of both instruments.  
The Hague instruments, like any other international treaties or conventions, have their own 
procedure for entry into force. For instance, Article 25 of the Hague Protocol states that ‘[t]he 
Protocol shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of three 
months after the deposit of the second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession referred to in Article 23’. For that reason, the Protocol entered into force in August 
2013, three month after Serbia ratified the text, following the EU ratification in 2010.  
On the other hand, EU instruments also regulate their entry into force. Article 76 of the 
4/2009 Regulation states that: ‘this Regulation shall apply from 18 June 2011, subject to the 
2007 Hague Protocol being applicable in the Community by that date. Failing that, this 
Regulation shall apply from the date of application of that Protocol in the Community.’ 
Accordingly, whether or not the EU Regulation would enter into force depended, in part, on 
the Hague Protocol, i.e., an international treaty, the entry into force of which did not depend 
on EU procedures.  
																																																								
17 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions 
and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, of 15. 12. 2005, COM/2005/0649 final, article 
12 and seq. 18	More generally on this issue, see. J. Scott, “Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law”, AJCL 
Vol. 62, n° 1, 2014. See also, in the present volume : Stephanie Francq:  “The External Dimension of the Rome I 
and Rome II Regulations: A Policy of Neutrality, Contrasting the Balanced Unilateralism of EU Substantive 
Law”, infra, chap. 4. 
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This is the reason why the Regulation contains a further provision in the Preamble which 
provides for the possibility that the Regulation enters into force before the Hague Protocol, or 
at least for the possibility that the Hague Protocol enters into force in some Member States 
only. As stated in recital 20 of the text:  
‘It should be provided in this Regulation that, for Member States bound by the 2007 Hague 
Protocol, the rules on conflict of laws in respect of maintenance obligations will be those set 
out in that Protocol. To that end, a provision referring to the said Protocol should be inserted. 
The 2007 Hague Protocol will be concluded by the Community in time to enable this 
Regulation to apply. To take account of a scenario in which the 2007 Hague Protocol does not 
apply to all the Member States a distinction for the purposes of recognition, enforceability and 
enforcement of decisions needs to be made in this Regulation between the Member States 
bound by the 2007 Hague Protocol and those not bound by it’.19 
To take into account this possibility, the recognition and enforcement section distinguishes 
between decisions rendered in a Member State which is bound by the 2007 Hague Protocol 
(art. 17 and seq.), on the one hand, and decisions rendered in a Member State which is not 
bound by the 2007 Hague Protocol (art. 23 and seq.), on the other hand.  
This cautious approach proved necessary since, as has just been seen, the Regulation entered 
into force on 2011 and the Protocol only in 2013. Therefore, there should have been a two 
years gap, during which the European instrument was in force, but not the Protocol, leaving 
the resolution of choice of law issues to each Member States. 
Such a solution was indeed complex, and European institutions decided it could be avoided. 
They decided to adopt an original and more radical approach. This approach is probably the 
best, in terms of efficiency, uniformity, and simplicity. It is, however, questionable from a 
legal point of view. The solution is twofold. 
First, the Council, as has been seen, decided to ratify the Hague Protocol in 2010.20 The 
competence to do so, however, was not obvious. The ERTA doctrine laid down by the ECJ 
links external competence to the actual exercise of internal competence. Therefore, the EU 
																																																								
19 Another difficulty needs to be mentioned: the peculiar situation of Denmark and UK regarding texts in matters 
of Freedom, security and justice (see Recital 47 and 48 of the 4/2009 Regulation and the declaration by the EU 
with the ratification decision of the Hague Protocol). This question will not be addressed here. 
20 Council Decision 2011/220 of 31 March 2011 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Hague 
Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family 
Maintenance, OJ L 93, 07.04.2011, p. 9 
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must have adopted a text dealing with the same questions as the international instrument at 
stake. This is the reason why, in recital 4 of its 2010 decision, the Council states that : 
‘Matters governed by the Convention are also dealt with in Council Regulation (EC) No 
4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of 
decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations. The Union should 
decide, in this particular case, to sign the Convention alone and to exercise competence over 
all the matters governed by it.’ 
But this assertion could be challenged since, precisely, there is no choice of law rule in the 
Regulation. Instead, as discussed above, Article 15 merely refers to the Hague Protocol in this 
context. Accordingly, the Hague Protocol and the Regulation have a different scope. The use 
of the word ‘matter’ in the decision is misleading because both texts concern broadly 
speaking the same ‘matter’, i.e. maintenance. However, the rules are completely different, 
since the Hague Protocol deals with choice of law issues, while European Regulation with the 
other private international law issues. Therefore, the rationale behind the ERTA doctrine — 
that is the risk of jeopardizing a European policy if external competence was exercised by 
Member States — is not respected. Since there is no autonomous choice of law rule in the 
Regulation, there is no risk of discrepancy if Member States decide or not to ratify the Hague 
Protocol.  
However, Article 15, which, once again, only provides that the EU will follow the rules of an 
international instrument, was deemed to be sufficient to exercise external competence. Since 
there is no substantive rule in Article 15, this solution appears to be nothing else than a self-
given exclusive external competence21 or, as an author elegantly put it ‘a competence by 
parthenogenesis’.22  
Secondly, to avoid the time-lap problem, EU made a declaration when it ratified the 
Protocol.23 This declaration states that:  
‘The European Community declares that it will apply the rules of the Protocol provisionally 
from 18 June 2011, the date of application of Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 
December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and 																																																								
21 C. Kohler, « Le nouveau régime transfrontalier des obligations alimentaires en Europe : interrogations sur le 
règlement (CE) 4/2009 du Conseil », Annuaire de droit européen 2008, vol. VI, Bruylant, 2011, p. 1175, at 
1183.  
22 C. Kohler and W. Pintens, « Entwicklungen im europaïschen Familien- und Erbrecht 2008-2009 », FamRZ. 
2009, 1529 at 1531. 
23 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Maintenance Protocol - Declarations and Notifications,  
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.comment&csid=1065&disp=type 
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cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, if the Protocol has not entered into 
force on that date in accordance with Article 25(1) thereof.’ 
This declaration creates somewhat of a strange legal creature, i.e. a set of European choice of 
law rules, adopted by reference to an international instrument, which is not in force, but 
nevertheless applicable in Europe. Such a solution is beyond legal analysis… 
Of course, legal criticisms have to be weighed with the obvious political will of both Member 
States and European institutions. Moreover, the solution that has been followed was probably 
the most reasonable and simplistic one, since it allowed for a global and simultaneous entry 
into force of the Hague Protocol in all the Member States. The downside of such a course of 
action is that that the legality of the Regulation could be challenged before the ECJ. A legal 
action, however, is doubtful for such a narrow and technical question. The aim of this analysis 
is therefore not to express some kind of legal bitterness or regret; only to confirm the 
impression that the question of the scope and the exercise of external competence are more 
political than legal in nature. 
  
Authorizing the accession of third States: The 1980 Convention 
 
Another question concerns the exact scope of the EU’s external competence. The question has 
been raised before the ECJ in relation to the accession of Russia to the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention. 
It is usual practice of the Hague Conference to distinguish between two groups of State : those 
which were a party to the Conference when the convention was adopted, and those which 
were not, and became a member of the Conference only thereafter. The states in the first 
group participated in the negotiations and thus ratification is sufficient for a convention to 
enter in force. In other words, no specific agreement or consent from the other States is 
required. To the contrary, if a State of the second group wishes to accede to a convention 
every other State, member of Conference that is already party to said convention must give its 
consent to this accession. For the 1980 Child Abduction Convention, the model is followed in 
Articles 37 and 38, which respectively state that:  
‘The Convention shall be open for signature by the States which were Members of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law at the time of its Fourteenth Session’,  
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and that :  
‘The accession will have effect only as regards the relations between the acceding State and 
such Contracting States as will have declared their acceptance of the accession’.  
Russia is a member of the Hague Conference since 2001. It wished to accede to the 1980 
Convention in 2011. Therefore, Russia’s accession needs to be accepted by the other 
Conference member States, already party to the 1980 Convention. Inside the EU, some 
Member States granted their consent. Between those Member States and Russia, the 1980 
Convention is now in force.24 However, other Member States, including Germany, Italy, 
Poland and the UK, have not accepted Russia’s accession yet and the Convention therefore is 
not in force in relation to those Member States 
Such a situation is not satisfying, particularly in a case where, as in child abduction matters, 
the Union is now governed by a completely unified set of rules since the adoption of the 
Brussels 2 bis regulation.25 As a matter of policy, a unified solution with third States would be 
preferable. 
However, such a unified solution requires an external competence of the EU. Once again, the 
existence and the scope of this external competence are questionable. The external 
competence exists today: Article 81 TFUE gives internal competence to the EU and such 
internal competence has been exercised by the adoption of the Brussels 2 bis Regulation, 
which organises a particular legal regime for intra-EU child abduction. However, the Hague 
Child Abduction Convention was adopted in 1980 and entered into force in 1983 in some 
Member States, long before the EU’s internal (and thus external) competences existed. 
Accordingly, regarding the accession of third States, it is unclear who, the EU or the Member 
States, must provide their consent to the accession. The background for this issue is again 
political and is related to the reluctance of certain Member States to accept Russia as part of 
the legal cooperation on child abduction under the Convention. Had they all accepted, it is 
more than likely that no one would have raised the issue. 
This divergence among Member States, and the need for a unified answer led the Commission 
to put the following question to the Court:   
																																																								
24 See the exact present state of the convention at: Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 
25 Council Regulation 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003, concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, OJ L 338 , 23. 12. 2003, p. 1. 
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‘Does the exclusive competence of the [European] Union encompass the acceptance of the 
accession of a non-Union country to the Convention on the civil aspects of international child 
abduction [concluded in the Hague on] 25 October 1980 [(‘the 1980 Hague Convention’ or 
‘the Convention’)]?’26 
The answer of the Court, given in Grand Chamber, has been delivered on the 14th of October 
2014. As suggested by the opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, the Court gives a positive 
answer to the question, and states that external exclusive competence does indeed encompass 
the acceptance of the accession of a third State to the 1980 Convention.  
The Court’s opinion, is not a surprise, but its exact outcome is still uncertain. It will more than 
likely have an important impact on the conventional relations between EU, Member States 
and third States, not only in relation to accession questions. The opinion of the Court will also 
influence the possibility for Member States to make declarations and reservations to 
conventions to which they are already a party to. More generally, the specific nature of the 
question asked is the possibility of a kind of retroactive application of the external 
competence. EU Regulations in private international family law all contain provisions dealing 
with the applicability of previously adopted conventions. The general principle is that prior 
conventions remain unaffected by the new rules. After the opinion of the Court, granting for 
an absolute and general external competence to the EU, this solution has now to be revised or, 
at least, nuanced. Given the dense multi- and bilateral network of conventions in force 
between Member States and third States, the opinion of the Court could have a significant 
legal and political impact.  
The major lesson to be learned from the study of the emergence of an EU external 
competence in matters of private international family law is therefore as follows: The 
existence, the scope, and the exercise of this external competence is a political question, as 
much as it is a legal one. It leads to an uncommon, flexible approach, which leaves room for 
political compromises and therefore for what lawyers hate most: uncertainty.  
 
II. EU family law instruments and third State : the example of jurisdiction  
 
EU or extra EU private international law 																																																								
26 Opinion Avis 1/13, OJ C 226, 03. 08. 2013, p. 2. 
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Since 2000, EU has slowly built a common private international law. More that 15 
Regulations are now in force in various fields of law, opening for a discussion about a 
possible general codification of European private international law.27 The specific nature of 
EU private international law has been under intense doctrinal scrutiny for the past decades. 
One of the questions regularly raised is the comparison between private international law 
inside the EU and private international law regarding relations with third countries. It is still 
quite unclear whether distinct private international law rules are needed. Should it be thought 
so, it would be necessary to draw a clear-cut line between rules applicable inside the EU and 
rules applicable outside the EU.28 
Such a distinction is fairly easy to make when it comes to procedural cooperation. In these 
situations, are involved an ‘outgoing’ State and an ‘incoming’ State. Both of them need to be 
Member State for the rules of cooperation to be applicable. That solution is followed in 
various topics: e.g. proof collecting29, service of documents30 or recognition and enforcement 
of judgments.31 In all these cases, cooperation under the concerned Regulation provision is 
possible if and only if it involves two member States. Third States, therefore, are not involved 
by the cooperation. The most striking example is to be found in articles 10 and 11 of the 
Brussels 2 bis Regulation. These articles deal with the child abduction issue, and lay down 
rules of cooperation that are specific to Member States, but take place inside the functioning 
of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention. EU Member States have organised a closer 
cooperation between them, but try to coordinate this cooperation with the one set up with 
third States. 
As far as choice of law is concerned, the difficulty is different, but also fairly simple to tackle. 
The fundamental option that has been taken by all the Regulations is to treat equally situations 
involving Member States only or Member States and third States. The choice of law rules are 
so-called ‘universal’, by which the law applicable is the law designated by the connecting 
factor, without making any distinction depending on whether this connecting factor is inside 
																																																								
27 See : Communication from the Commission, ‘The EU Justice agenda for 2020 – Strengthening trust, mobility 
and growth within the EU’,  COM 2014/0144 Final, par. 4-2.  
28 See A. Nuyts and N. Watté (eds), International civil litigation in Europe and relations with third States, 
Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005. 
29 Reg. 12096/2001, art. 1 
30 Reg. 1393/2007, article 1 
31 Reg. Brussels 1: 44/2001 and 1215/2012, art. 33 and 36; Reg. Brussels 2: 2201/2003, art. 21; Reg. EET 
805/2004, art. 1… 
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or outside of the EU. The model for such a rule is to be found in article 2 of the Rome 1 
Regulation on contracts32 which states:  
‘Any law specified by this Regulation shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a 
Member State’.  
The same model is followed in all the other Regulations dealing with choice of law: Rome 
II33, or, in family matters, maintenance34, divorce35 or successions.36 
But it is much more complicated when it comes to international jurisdiction. In all the 
previous examples, the question always involved two legal systems, which needed to be 
coordinated. On the contrary, when it comes to jurisdiction, only one legal system is involved: 
the system of the judge seized. Cases can have various connections to various States, within 
or outside the EU. Would, for example a sales contract between a German domiciled and an 
Argentinian domiciled, with a delivery of goods in Canada be considered to be a contract 
“inside the EU” ? Would it be different if goods were to be delivered in Italy ?  
Per se, international jurisdiction issue concerns only the tribunal of one State, and it is 
therefore extremely difficult to make a clear distinction between a legal regime that would 
concern Member States only and another that would concern relations between Member 
States and third States. The distinction between ‘intra-EU’ and ‘Extra EU’ situations is almost 
impossible to make.37  
As a policy issue, it can be accepted that there is and should be a closer cooperation between 
Member States that between Member States and third States. The fundamental European 
principle of mutual trust, and the grid of European Judicial Network allows for close 
cooperation between authorities, for the sake of the European Citizens. But the question 
remains to determine how to implement this policy in jurisdiction matters38, taking into 
																																																								
32 Reg. 593/2008.  
33 Reg. 846/2007, article 3 
34 Reg. 4/2009, which, as has been seen, refers to the Hague Protocol of 2007, in which article 2 gives universal 
effect to the choice of law rule. 
35 Reg. 1259/2010 (Rome 3 Regulation), art. 4  
36 Reg. 650/2012 , art. 20 
37  In general, see Etienne Pataut, « Qu’est-ce qu’un litige intracommunautaire ? », Justice et droits 
fondamentaux, Mélanges J. Normand, Litec, 2003, p. 365. See also, in the present volume : Angela Ward & N 
Jääskinen: “The External Reach of EU Private Law in the Light of L’Oreal v eBay and Google and Google 
Spain”, infra, chap. 6, at IV. 
38 Andrea Bonomi, ‘The opportunity and the modalities of the introduction of Erga Omnes EC rules on 
jurisdiction’, in A. Malatesta, S. Bariatti, F. Pocar (ed.), The external dimension of EC private international law 
in Family and Successions Matters, Studi e pubblicazioni delle rivista di diritto internazionale privato et 
processuale, vol. 71, CEDAM, 2008, p. 149.  
	 15	
consideration that the decision taken will have an important impact on recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.39 
Here again, the question is much more political than purely technical. From the family law 
perspective, it will be submitted that if indeed there is a distinction between different private 
law relationships, this distinction should not lie upon the jurisdiction rule itself, and that the 
real difficulty concerns exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction. 
As far as jurisdiction is concerned, several models exist, all of them being tested in various 
European Union instruments. 
The original model was set up in the 1968 Brussels Convention, and unchanged in the 
provisions of its follower, the Brussels 1 Regulation. Following article 2 and 4 of the text, the 
very applicability of the rules of jurisdiction, subject to a few exceptions, was based on the 
fact that the defendant was domiciled in a Member State. Therefore, a distinction was drawn 
between litigation which involved a defendant domiciled in a third State, for which 
jurisdiction had to be decided upon by national rules and litigation which involved a 
defendant domiciled in a member State, for which jurisdiction had to be decided upon by 
European rules. 
This solution, however was partly abandoned during the recast of the Brussels 1 Regulation.40 
Moreover, it has never been followed in family matters, for which existing texts hesitate 
between semi-universal, or universal rules. This latter model seems preferable, although it 
leaves open the difficult and political question of the existence of exorbitant grounds of 
jurisdiction. 
Semi universal rules : The Brussels 2 bis approach 
The Brussels 2 bis approach is very different from Brussels 1, as the applicability of the 
jurisdiction rules are not limited by any connecting factor drawing a specific territorial scope 
of application. Therefore, once the jurisdiction connecting factor is located in a Member State, 
then the courts of that Member State have jurisdiction, regardless of the other connecting 
factors. Therefore, in divorce cases, if art. 3 of the Regulation gives jurisdiction to the courts 																																																								
39 See part. Marc Fallon and Thalia Kruger, ‘The spatial scope of the EU’s rules on jurisdiction and enforcement 
of judgments : from bilateral modus to unilateral universality ?’, Yearbook of Private International Law, 
2012/2013, vol. 14, p. 1. 
40 Partly only, unfortunately, and despite the proposal of the Commission, which suggested the deletion of the 
rule. See part. the critics in European Commission, Report on the application of Council Regulation n° 44/2001, 
COM (2009) 174 final of 21.4.2009, par. 3-2 and the proposal of a new article 4 in European Commission, 
Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, COM (2010) 748 final of 14.12. 2010.  
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of a Member State (because of habitual residence, for example), these courts have 
jurisdiction, regardless of all the other connecting factors. Member State national rules are not 
applicable at all.  
Such a solution was new and could appear somewhat puzzling for judges. This might explain 
why, for example, the French Cour de cassation affirmed the jurisdiction of the French court 
pursuant to article 14 of the French civil code and not to the Brussels 2 Regulation in a case 
where the members of the family had French and/or Moroccan nationality, where the wife and 
children were living in France but where the husband was living in Morocco, and where 
jurisdiction of the French court was challenged in favour of jurisdiction of Moroccan courts, 
by virtue of a bilateral convention.41 It is very likely that the ‘franco-morrocan’ nature of the 
relationship hid the fact that an EU piece of legislation was actually applicable. Applicable it 
was, nevertheless, and if indeed the French courts had jurisdiction, it was thanks to article 3 of 
the original Brussels 2 Regulation (Reg. 1347/2000) and not to article 14 of the French civil 
code. 
On the contrary, the correct interpretation has been given by the ECJ in one of the first 
decision interpreting the original Brussels 2 Regulation.42 In that situation, which was close to 
the one decided upon by French courts, a Swedish national domiciled in France wanted to 
obtain divorce from her Cuban husband, who had returned to Cuba. She seized the Swedish 
Courts, arguing they had jurisdiction, based on her nationality. The argument, however, was 
dismissed by the ECJ. As the Court perfectly clearly said (n°28):  
‘where, in divorce proceedings, a respondent is not habitually resident in a Member State and 
is not a National of a Member State, the courts of a Member State cannot base their 
jurisdiction to hear the petition on their national law, if the courts of another Member State 
have jurisdiction under art. 3 of the Regulation’. 
This solution is far better than the one in Brussels 1. In jurisdiction matters, the question is not 
to determine whether one or more EU countries are concerned with the legal relationship 
challenged before the court. The only question is to select an appropriate connecting factor 
and, if this connecting factor aims at a particular country, give jurisdiction to the courts of that 
country. The fact that jurisdiction rules are being harmonised at EU level does not make any 
difference. It does not imply that the legal relationship concerned needs to be connected to 																																																								
41 Civ. 1, 28 mars 2006, JCP. 2006. II. 10133, note A. Devers. The bilateral convention was in fact not 
applicable to the case. 
42 ECJ, 29 nov. 2007, C-68/07, Sundelind Lopez. The Brussels 2 bis Regulation has kept the same provisions. 
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two or more Member States. As far as jurisdiction is concerned, there is no theoretical 
difference between national rule of jurisdiction and unified rules of jurisdiction, and for third 
countries, there is no difference between national or European jurisdiction rules. The structure 
of the rule is the same and the application is the same. 
Therefore, adding, as in Brussels 1, a distinction between ‘intra EU’ cases and ‘Extra EU’ 
cases in order to determine the very applicability of European or national jurisdiction rules 
seems to be of great complexity for no satisfying theoretical or practical reason.  
Brussels 2 Regulation, however, does not radically exclude all national rules. For divorce 
cases, article 6 and 7 organise a regime where national rules of jurisdiction can be used only 
when no connecting factor used by the regular jurisdiction rule is located in a Member State ; 
but in any case these national grounds of jurisdiction cannot be used against a defendant 
habitually resident in the EU, domiciled in the Common law sense in the United Kingdom or 
Ireland, or national of a Member State. Lastly, EU nationals habitually resident of another 
Member State can avail themselves of the national rules of jurisdiction of that State against a 
defendant who is neither habitually resident in the EU, nor EU national, nor domiciled in the 
Common law sense in the UK or in Ireland.43 
Things are simpler when it comes to parental responsibility, since article 14 simply states that 
‘where no court of a Member State has jurisdiction pursuant to article 8 to 13, jurisdiction 
shall be determined in each Member State by the laws of that State’. 
Even though the formulation, at least in divorce cases, might seem complicated, the aim is 
very simple and the text is able to draw a clear line between national and European rules of 
jurisdiction. The latter are applicable when the former are not, i.e when no connecting factor 
links the case and the courts of a particular Member State. Therefore, as in Brussels 1, 
national law on international jurisdiction has not completely disappeared, although, as it will 
be shown, its role is completely different. 
Universal Rules : The Maintenance and Succession Regulations approach 
The Maintenance Regulation (4/2009) and the Successions Regulation (650/2012) have 
adopted another model, simpler and, it is argued, better.44 
Article 3, 4 and 5 of the maintenance Regulation give the main connecting factors for a court 
of a Member State to have jurisdiction. Mostly, are involved habitual residence, choice of 																																																								
43 A. Borras, ‘Art. 6 and 7’ in U. Magnus and P. Mankowski (eds.), Brussels II bis Regulation, Sellier, 2012. 
44 For a close analysis, see also A. Bonomi, op. cit., at 153. 
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court by the parties, mere appearance of the defendant. Another possibility is to give 
jurisdiction to the courts of the Member State which has jurisdiction in a connected family 
matter.  
If no Member State court has jurisdiction in that situation, then art. 6 opens for a subsidiary 
jurisdiction based on the common nationality of the parties. Lastly, if no Member State has 
jurisdiction pursuant to all these rules, art. 7 opens for a forum necessitatis, based on the fact 
that a proceeding cannot be reasonably brought before the courts of a third State.  
As one can see, there is no room at all for national rules of jurisdiction.  
Although the rules are different, the same model have been adopted in the Succession 
Regulation. Chapter II (art. 4 and seq.) organises a complete and closed jurisdiction system. 
Basically, the competent courts are those of the habitual residence of the deceased (art. 4). In 
addition, it is possible to have jurisdiction based on choice of forum, choice of law, or mere 
appearance (art. 5, 6 and 9). If none of these conditions are met, then a court of a Member 
State can have specific jurisdiction over goods of the deceased that are located in the forum or 
general jurisdiction if, in addition, the deceased is either a national of that State or had its 
former habitual residence in that State (art. 10). Lastly, if no Member State has jurisdiction 
pursuant to all these rules, art. 11 also opens for a forum necessitatis, based, once again, on 
the fact that a proceeding cannot be reasonably brought before the courts of a third State. 
Once again, national rules of jurisdiction are completely left aside. 
Exorbitant rules of jurisdiction 
In the Brussels 1 text, two separate bodies of international rules of jurisdiction are still 
necessary, since when the defendant is domiciled outside the EU, the basic rules of 
jurisdiction do not apply, even when the connecting factor (e.g, the place of the tort) is located 
in a Member State. Therefore, the use of national rules of jurisdiction is inevitable and not 
limited to exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction. In Brussels 2 bis, on the contrary, there is no 
need for national rules of jurisdiction. The provisions of the Regulation completely supersede 
national rules, and are potentially applicable to every situation.  
Therefore, article 6 and 7 of Brussels 2 bis completely differ from article 4 of Brussels 1: 
where article 4 is a technical necessity, article 6 and 7 are a fundamental policy choice. 
Article 4 is a technical necessity, since one needs to know what happens when the defendant 
is domiciled outside the EU; in addition, it leaves room for exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction. 
	 19	
On the contrary, the only objective of article 6 and 7 is to allow the use of exorbitant grounds 
of jurisdiction.  
Exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction are difficult to define. As a broad definition, exorbitant 
jurisdiction can be defined as rules of jurisdiction based on criteria that cannot be considered 
as a reasonable link between the dispute and the forum. Of course, as it is extremely difficult 
to precisely define what a “reasonable link” is, the distinction between ‘exorbitant’ and ‘non 
exorbitant’ ground of jurisdiction is largely a matter of policy. The choice in Brussels 2 bis, is 
to base divorce jurisdiction on habitual residence and nationality of both spouses. It could be 
argued, and indeed is very often, that the habitual residence accepted in Brussels 2 bis is too 
large. However, taken the text as it is, it results clearly from the provisions of the family 
matters regulations that every rule that has not been accepted as a basis for jurisdiction is to 
be considered as exorbitant. The hierarchical relationship between European rules of 
jurisdiction and national rules of jurisdiction makes that very clear. 
Brussels 2 bis, Maintenance and Succession Regulations accept that, in some cases, Courts of 
a Member State can be given jurisdiction in a situation where none of the connecting factors 
of the ordinary rules are located within the EU. In other words, it is only when the jurisdiction 
rules in the Regulations do not point any judge in the EU that national rules can be used. 
National rules of international jurisdiction are secondary, inferior rules. Moreover, the 
exceptional nature of these situations is stressed by the fact, in Brussels 2, EU nationals, the 
EU residents and the UK or Ireland domiciled are immune from these forum and, in the two 
other Regulations the rules are of subsidiary nature. 
Therefore, as one can see, two very different questions are here at stake. The first one is to 
determine whether there should be room for national rules of jurisdiction in general, based on 
the fact that the litigation is located in the EU. The second one is to determine whether one 
needs exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction, and if so, if those exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction 
should be governed by national or European rules.  
It is argued that the family law model is far better for answering the first question. Once 
again, in our view, there is no theoretical nor practical convincing argument in favour of 
keeping two sets of rules for international jurisdiction. Once the political decision of adopting 
European rules, these rules should completely replace their national counterparts.  
 
Do we need exorbitant rules of jurisdiction ?  
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It is far from obvious that exorbitant rules of jurisdiction are needed and there are today 
strong arguments against such rules.45 These arguments seem particularly strong in family 
matters, where the international harmony of solution is of the utmost importance. Exorbitant 
grounds of jurisdiction jeopardize recognition abroad and, therefore, should be used only 
when strong policy arguments favour the attraction of a specific litigation before the courts of 
a particular Member State. 
Moreover, it is to be regretted that national law could not be completely left aside. If ever it 
appeared really impossible to completely refuse exorbitant jurisdiction in family matters in 
Europe, then why could such a choice not be done at European level? If complete unification 
of ordinary rules of jurisdiction is possible, then it could also be possible, or at least 
thoroughly discussed, to unify exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction. Therefore, the solution 
eventually adopted in Brussels 2 bis, even if it is better than the one adopted in Brussels 1, can 
be criticised. It seems rather unpredictable and, since every Member State is free to keep any 
rule it considers useful for whatever reasons, it does not reflect a policy that would be 
endorsed by the whole EU. Since the ‘europeanisation’ of jurisdiction has been decided, the 
same should follow with the exorbitant rules.  
This analysis is obviously shared by the Commission. A few years ago, a modification of the 
Brussels 2 text was proposed.46 In that proposal, the Commission suggested to adopt two 
uniform exorbitant rules: one based on the nationality of one of the spouses, the other based 
on the fact that the spouses had a common habitual residence on the territory of a Member 
State for three years. Indeed, those rules could be contested, for the need of exorbitant rule 
can be challenged. But at least, predictability would be enhanced by unification. This solution 
has eventually not been yet accepted by Member States for divorce47, but, as we have seen, it 
has for successions and maintenance. 
The Brussels 2 bis rules, also leads to a strange solution, because of the choice that has been 
made to protect from national rules an important class of defendants, those who are integrated 
in the EU, either by habitual residence, domicile (UK or Ireland) or nationality. Therefore, 
this rule organises an open discrimination towards national from third countries living abroad. 																																																								
45 See in particular (in the Brussels 1 context) D. Fernandez Arroyo, « Exorbitant and exclusive grounds of 
jurisdiction in European private international law : will they ever survive ? », Festschrift für E. Jayme, Sellier, 
2004, p. 169. 
46 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) n° 2201/2003 as 
regards jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, COM (2006) 399 
Final, of 17 July 2006, proposal for a new article 7, p. 14. 
47 As it has not been accepted for the Brussels 1 recast, where the Commission also suggested a uniform set of 
exorbitant rules, including a forum necessitatis, which has been rejected by Member States.  
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Such a policy choice in favour of an open discrimination can be challenged. The reasons for 
such discrimination do not clearly appear, especially in family matters. Once again, 
international harmony is of great importance in family matters, and therefore the possibility of 
international recognition should always be taken into account. Outside article 3, 4 and 5, and 
because of this protection of EU nationals and EU residents, Member States courts will only 
hear cases with almost no connection at all with their territory, seriously challenging the 
chances of international recognition of their decision. It is to be regretted that such an 
important choice is not more justified, for cases where it does not seem that the competence 
of a Member State court is really justified. 
It seems that the forum necessitatis which has been adopted in both the Succession and 
Maintenance Regulations is to be preferred. It allows for exceptional extension of jurisdiction 
of the courts of a member State, when the foreign forum with the closest connection is 
unavailable, or when it would be too much of a burden for the plaintiff. Although the rule 
leaves room for uncertainty, it is a better approach to the exceptional nature of the 
intervention of the Member State court. 
Therefore, as one can see, it is argued that, when it comes to jurisdiction, there is no really 
convincing reason to make unclear distinction between European an non-European litigation. 
The question is not to determine whether there are connections with third States, but only to 
determine whether the connecting factor adopted by a jurisdiction rule is located in Europe or 
abroad. When it comes to jurisdiction, the whole European territory should be considered as a 
single legal order. Certainty and simplicity would certainly gain a lot if the Successions or 
Maintenance model was followed.   
  
